India is building a system in which technology may be global, but national decisions remain independent; investment may be foreign, but the rules are determined by Indian law; and cooperation may be international, but strategic choices remain firmly in India’s hands.
Historically, colonialism was identified by soldiers, warships, foreign flags, and the occupation of territory. Colonial powers seized control of a country’s resources, controlled its trade, and shaped its political system to serve their own interests. In the twenty-first century, however, the nature of colonialism is changing. Today, a country’s economy, information, markets, and social behaviour can be influenced without occupying its territory. The weapons required for this purpose are no longer limited to guns. They now include data, algorithms, cloud computing, digital platforms, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors. This is the central question posed by technological colonialism.
In this emerging landscape, the recent dispute between Elon Musk and India over Starlink offers an important example. The controversy is not merely about granting a foreign company access to the Indian market. The fundamental question is whether the economic power and public influence of global technology companies can become instruments of pressure on the regulatory processes of a sovereign nation.
Elon Musk raised questions about the delay in Starlink’s commercial launch in India and used social media to take a sarcastic swipe at Mukesh Ambani. The Government of India rejected these allegations, stating that companies such as Starlink, Jio Satellite Communications, and Eutelsat OneWeb were undergoing security clearance and spectrum allocation procedures. According to available reports, Musk did not present public evidence to substantiate his allegations.
Technologies such as Starlink can play a valuable role in expanding internet access across India’s remote regions. However, a company’s technological capabilities or the global stature of its founder cannot place it above Indian law. If a company is required to fulfil security-related conditions, the same regulatory process must apply equally to all companies. The public popularity of a business leader cannot serve as a substitute for regulatory decision-making.
Data Is the New Resource, but Control Over It Is the Real Power
During the industrial age, coal, oil, steel, and maritime trade were the principal foundations of economic power. In the digital age, data has also emerged as a strategic resource. Data generated through citizens’ digital activities, consumer preferences, financial transactions, health-related information, and industrial processes creates value in the modern economy. With the advancement of artificial intelligence, the importance of this data has increased even further.
If foreign platforms and technology companies capture most of the economic value generated by data originating from a country’s citizens and enterprises, while the domestic economy receives only limited benefits, questions about the distribution of digital development are inevitable. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in its Digital Economy Report 2024, highlighted inequalities in the digital economy and the environmental and economic pressures faced by developing countries. According to the report, the energy consumption of digital devices, data centres, and communication networks accounts for an estimated 6 to 12 per cent of global electricity use.
Data sovereignty does not mean confining all information within a country’s geographical borders. It means protecting citizens’ privacy, ensuring that data is used under clear and lawful rules, maintaining appropriate control over data related to national interests, and building the country’s capacity to generate economic and scientific value from its own data.
Expanding Influence Through Algorithms
Influencing a society does not always require controlling its government. If digital platforms begin determining which news citizens see, which products they buy, which ideas receive greater attention, and which information takes priority, these platforms acquire the ability to shape public discourse.
Similarly, artificial intelligence models generate responses to questions concerning language, history, culture, and social behaviour. If a country’s education, administration, research, and business decision-making processes become excessively dependent on a few external technological systems, its intellectual independence may also be affected. In 2024, UNCTAD warned that the concentration of advanced AI systems and their underlying infrastructure in the hands of a few large companies could pose challenges to the technological capabilities and policy autonomy of developing countries.
The issue here is not about rejecting foreign technology, but about ensuring that technology enhances citizens’ capabilities rather than turning them into passive consumers of opaque systems. A multilingual and diverse country like India must develop AI models that understand Indian languages, local needs, constitutional values, and social realities.
Information Warfare, Where the Target Is the Public Mind
In conventional warfare, an adversary’s military capabilities, communications, and physical infrastructure are targeted. In information warfare, the targets can also include people’s perceptions, social trust, and the credibility of institutions. Misinformation, fake news websites, bot networks, deepfake videos, and coordinated social media campaigns can be used to create confusion and distrust within a society.
A March 2025 report by the European External Action Service (EEAS) of the European Union analysed various foreign information manipulation and interference networks linked to Russia and China. The report described methods used to influence the information environment through digital infrastructure, social media, and other channels.
In the Russia-Ukraine war, information warfare has become an important component of the military conflict. According to a European Union study, Kremlin-backed disinformation campaigns reached at least 165 million people across the European Union and its partners during the first year of the war, generating at least 16 billion views. These figures represent the study’s estimates and do not establish that every individual was influenced. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the enormous scale at which information can spread across digital platforms.
Following the first round of Romania’s 2024 presidential election, serious investigations were conducted into foreign interference and online campaigning. Romanian authorities presented evidence relating to cyberattacks, misinformation, and influence campaigns. The Constitutional Court annulled the electoral process. These developments triggered a broader debate across Europe about electoral sovereignty and the accountability of digital platforms.
During Moldova’s 2024 presidential election and referendum on European Union membership, authorities reported foreign interference involving illegal financing, disinformation, cyberattacks, and social media campaigning. The country’s security service referred to the identification of propaganda networks on Telegram, TikTok, and YouTube. These allegations and findings should be understood in the context of reports issued by Moldovan authorities and international institutions.
The lesson from these examples is that digital sovereignty extends far beyond protecting data. It also involves providing citizens with reliable information, preserving the integrity of electoral processes, and protecting public discourse from coordinated manipulation.
Chips, Cloud Computing, and the Strategic Cost of Technological Dependence
Digital sovereignty cannot be achieved merely by establishing data centres. It requires reliable access to hardware, chip design, semiconductor manufacturing, network equipment, cybersecurity, cloud management, and advanced computing.
If a country’s defence systems, telecommunications networks, banking services, and AI infrastructure depend on equipment or software that it cannot independently control, repair, or replace, disruptions to external supplies can undermine its strategic capabilities. Export controls, sanctions, and geopolitical tensions can make this dependence even more consequential.
This challenge is particularly significant for India. According to the semiconductor roadmap released by NITI Aayog in May 2026, approximately 90 to 95 per cent of India’s chip demand is met through imports. This dependence on semiconductors creates strategic risks for sectors such as defence, telecommunications, electric vehicles, healthcare technology, and digital public infrastructure.
Therefore, investment in semiconductor manufacturing, chip design, advanced packaging, domestic cloud capabilities, and cybersecurity is not merely a matter of industrial policy. It is an investment in the nation’s future independence.
Opportunities and Responsibilities Before India
India has developed significant capabilities in the field of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). Aadhaar, UPI, DigiLocker, and other digital platforms have expanded access to services and enabled digital transactions on a massive scale. India’s next objective should not be limited to increasing the adoption of digital services. It should also focus on strengthening its capabilities in the underlying technologies, research, computing infrastructure, and intellectual property that power these services.
The Government of India’s IndiaAI initiative and semiconductor programme are important in the context of this broader challenge. In August 2026, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology emphasised strengthening technological self-reliance through indigenous AI models, computing capabilities, and semiconductor initiatives in India.
However, self-reliance does not mean developing every technology independently. Global cooperation, foreign investment, and international research networks are essential for every country. Genuine technological sovereignty means retaining the ability to make critical decisions, choose alternative suppliers, test one’s own systems, and switch technologies when necessary, even while engaging in international cooperation.
To achieve this, India should advance in five key directions. First, it should strengthen domestic research and development in semiconductors, AI, and cybersecurity. Second, it should develop AI models tailored to Indian languages and local requirements. Third, it should create secure and diversified cloud and software alternatives for critical government and strategic systems. Fourth, it should establish effective regulations that protect competition, data privacy, transparency, and consumer rights. Fifth, it should enable Indian startups, universities, and companies to play a more significant role in global technology value chains.
Sovereignty Does Not Mean Technological Isolation, but Freedom of Choice
One important caution is necessary when discussing technological sovereignty. It would be inappropriate to view every foreign company with suspicion or to assume that every domestic product is superior simply because it is indigenous. Competition drives innovation, while international cooperation provides access to knowledge and investment. However, openness must not mean accepting dependence.
A country’s true independence should be measured by whether it can secure its essential services, maintain alternative technological options, protect its citizens’ data, and make decisions in accordance with its own laws despite external pressure.
This is why technological sovereignty has become an extension of national security. Just as industrial development can be disrupted without energy security, excessive dependence on digital infrastructure and critical technologies can constrain economic independence.
The most modern form of colonialism would be one in which a country’s borders remain independent, its government is democratically elected, and its markets remain open, yet control over its critical technologies, data, digital infrastructure, and knowledge systems is concentrated elsewhere. This risk does not automatically arise from every foreign technology, but excessive concentration and the absence of alternatives can make it a reality.
India is building a system in which technology may be global, but national decisions remain independent; investment may be foreign, but the rules are determined by Indian law; and cooperation may be international, but strategic choices remain firmly in India’s hands.
The goal of Viksit Bharat 2047 is not merely to achieve economic prosperity. It also involves building a national framework that is technologically capable, economically resilient, and independent in its policymaking. Today, soldiers defend sovereignty at the borders. In the years ahead, scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, data specialists, and technological institutions will play an equally important role in safeguarding it.
In the twenty-first century, freedom will mean more than a country’s ability to determine its own future. It will also mean having effective control over, and genuine alternatives in, the technologies that shape that future. This is technological sovereignty, and it is an essential condition for being an independent nation in the new era.
